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Mobile Privacy and Business-to-
Platform Dependencies: An 
Analysis of SEC Disclosures 
RONAN Ó FATHAIGH, JORIS VAN HOBOKEN & NICO VAN EIJK* 
This Article systematically examines the dependence of mobile 
apps on mobile platforms for the collection and use of personal 
information through an analysis of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings of mobile app companies. The 
Article uses these disclosures to find systematic evidence of 
how app business models are shaped by the governance of user 
data by mobile platforms, in order to reflect on the role of 
platforms in privacy regulation more generally. The analysis 
of SEC filings documented in the Article produces new and 
unique insights into the data practices and data-related 
aspects of the business models of popular mobile apps and 
shows the value of SEC filings for privacy law and policy 
research more generally. The discussion of SEC filings and 
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to thank the participants of the 2018 Privacy Law Scholars Conference at
the George Washington University School of Law for very helpful
comments on an earlier draft. This paper is part of a multidisciplinary
research project of the University of Amsterdam and MIT on
transparency in smartphone ecosystems, funded by the Dutch National
Science Foundation (NWO) and NSF. The project addresses the question
of how transparency requirements in data privacy law map to the
smartphone context, looking at the way in which different regulatory
environments for data privacy (E.U. and U.S.) shape transparency about
the collection and use of personal data in dominant smartphone
ecosystems (Android and Apple iOS).
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privacy builds on regulatory developments in SEC disclosures 
and cybersecurity of the last decade. The Article also connects 
to recent regulatory developments in the U.S. and Europe, 
including the General Data Protection Regulation, the 
proposals for a new ePrivacy Regulation and a Regulation of 
fairness in business-to-platform relations. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Activision Blizzard Inc., which acquired the developer of the 
Candy Crush Saga mobile application for $5.8 billion in 2016, 
sounded a warning note in its February 2018 filings with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) about its 
dependence on mobile platforms. Activision explained that if 
these platforms, such as Apple’s App Store or the Google Play 
store, “change how the personal information of consumers is 
made available to developers, [its] business could be 
negatively impacted.”1 Similarly, Facebook Inc., with 
revenues of $40.6 billion in 2017, also warned in its SEC 
                                                 
1 Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 27, 2018). 
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filings about its dependence on mobile platforms. Given that 
nearly 90 percent of its revenue is now generated from 
advertising on mobile devices, any changes by mobile 
platforms which “limit [its] ability to deliver, target, or 
measure” advertising on mobile devices could “adversely 
affect . . . monetization on mobile devices.”2  
This Article examines the dependence of mobile apps 
on mobile platforms for the collection, use and monetization 
of personal information. In particular, the Article explores 
how app business models are shaped by the governance of 
user data by mobile platforms, and what the implications 
may be for the position of mobile platforms in privacy 
regulation.3 Most privacy regulations in the U.S. and Europe 
do not provide for specific obligations of mobile platforms, 
except for a number of issued recommendations and a 
provision on privacy settings in Article 10 of the recently 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation in the E.U.4 In the broader 
context of online platforms, the European Commission has 
begun to examine business-to-platform relationships, which 
is an “under-researched subject, both empirically and 
theoretically.”5 This Article seeks to contribute to the 
                                                 
2 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018).  
3 See Daniel Greene & Katie Shilton, Platform Privacies: Governance, 
Collaboration, and the Different Meanings of “Privacy” in iOS and 
Android Development, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1640 (2018), available at 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817702397 (discussing the meaning of 
privacy on the iOS and Android platforms); see also Katie Shilton & 
Daniel Greene, Linking Platforms, Practices, and Developer Ethics: 
Levers for Privacy Discourse in Mobile Application Development, J. BUS. 
ETHICS (Mar. 28, 2017), available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-
3504-8 (discussing when and how privacy conversations arise during 
mobile application development).  
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal 
Data in Electronic Communications and Repealing Directive 
2002/58/EC, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017). 
5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THE 
 Mobile Privacy and Business-to-Platform Dependencies 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 52 
 
understanding of such business-to-platform dependencies in 
the mobile app environment, particularly relating to the use 
of personal information.  
To understand this dependence, this Article examines 
the SEC filings of U.S. public companies that predominantly 
operate their business, or important parts of their business, 
as popular apps in the mobile app ecosystem. Our approach 
is motivated by a series of initial public offerings (IPOs) by 
major mobile app companies, and a number of app 
acquisitions by existing public companies. Previously, many 
of the companies behind the most popular mobile apps were 
private companies with closed books, making a full 
understanding of their data collection practices and business 
models more difficult.6 However, an increasing number of 
app companies are now publicly traded, and therefore subject 
to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934.7 They are required to make certain disclosures 
to the SEC on a regular basis. In particular, companies must 
disclose the most significant “risk factors” associated with a 
company’s business. In the current day and age of mobile 
business, these risks include aspects relating to user data 
                                                 
ONLINE PLATFORM ENVIRONMENT 17 (2017) (hereinafter Online Platform 
Environment), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publ 
ication/04c75b09-4b2b-11e7-aea8-01aa75ed71a1 (citing Néstor Duch-
Brown, The Competitive Landscape of Online Platforms, JRC TECHNICAL 
REPORTS (2017), http://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/ jrc106299.pdf); 
see also Commission Inception Impact Assessment on Fairness in 
Platform-to-Business Relations, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-5222469_en (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
6 See Ilaria Liccardi et al., Improving Mobile App Selection through 
Transparency and Better Permission Analysis, 5 J. PRIVACY & 
CONFIDENTIALITY 1 (2013) (discussing the technical difficulties with 
measuring personal information collected by mobile applications); see 
also Jinyan Zang et al., Who Knows What About Me? A Survey of Behind 
the Scenes Personal Data Sharing to Third Parties by Mobile Apps, TECH. 
SCI. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015103001/.    
7 See infra notes 49–50. 
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collection, data privacy, personal information, and the role of, 
and dependency on, dominant mobile platforms.8  
Moreover, our approach is informed by recent 
scholarship on cybersecurity disclosures in SEC filings. This 
scholarship has mainly focused on the risks to consumer 
privacy from data breaches,9 with some using case-study 
methods to analyze SEC disclosures on cybersecurity,10 while 
others have engaged in empirical longitudinal analysis of 
SEC disclosures on cybersecurity.11 Privacy scholars have not 
yet examined SEC disclosures concerning data privacy in 
mobile app ecosystems. Considering the growing business 
and financial market implications of privacy governance and 
regulation,12 which the SEC has also recognized,13 we believe 
                                                 
8 See infra notes 11–12 (discussing issues like data privacy and breaches 
of that privacy). 
9 See Joel Bronstein, The Balance Between Informing Investors and 
Protecting Companies: A Look at the Division of Corporation Finance's 
Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements, 13 N.C. J.L. 
& TECH. ONLINE EDITION 257 (2012); Sam Young, Comment, 
Contemplating Corporate Disclosure Obligations Arising from 
Cybersecurity Breaches, 38 J. CORP. L. 659 (2013); Mathew F. Ferraro, 
Groundbreaking or Broken? An Analysis of SEC Cybersecurity Disclosure 
Guidance, Its Effectiveness, and Implications, 77 ALB. L. REV. 297 (2014); 
Norah C. Avellan, Note, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Growing Need for Cybersecurity in Modern Corporate America, 54 
WASHBURN L.J. 193 (2014); and Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, 
Cybersecurity: Should the SEC Be Sticking Its Nose Under This Tent?, 
2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35 (2016). 
10 See Ferraro, supra note 9, at 324–35. 
11 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, 
Corporate Information Security and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 129, 173-82 (2005). 
12 See, e.g., Federica Cocco, Facebook Slides 4% after Cambridge Analytica 
Revelations, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ 
66db1ee2-2b57-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381.   
13 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cybersecurity, (Sept. 20, 
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-20 
17-09-20 (“Data collection, storage, analysis, availability and protection 
(including security, validation and recovery) have become fundamental to 
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SEC disclosure analysis has become an important additional 
source of information for privacy research (and practice). By 
analyzing the SEC filings of a select number of public app 
companies in view of our research question on the 
relationship between apps and mobile platforms, we also 
provide evidence on the value of these privacy governance 
and risk disclosures in SEC filings for privacy research more 
generally. 
The Article is divided into the following sections: Part 
I introduces the issues relating to privacy in mobile 
ecosystems, and the current literature on privacy regulation 
in mobile platforms. Part II then describes and discusses the 
study undertaken to examine the SEC filings of a set of U.S. 
public companies that predominantly operate their business, 
or important parts of their business, as popular apps in the 
mobile app ecosystem. Finally, Part III provides a discussion 
on the value of SEC filings for understanding the dependence 
of mobile apps on mobile platforms for the collection, use and 
monetization of personal information.    
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Mobile Privacy 
 
Transparency is a fundamental principle in data privacy 
regulation, and is particularly important in smartphone 
ecosystems,14 given the unique privacy risks associated with 
mobile devices and mobile applications.15 However, as 
                                                 
the function and performance of our capital markets, the individuals and 
entities that participate in those markets, and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission.”). 
14 See Joris van Hoboken et al., Transparency and Privacy in Smartphone 
Eco-systems: A Comparative Perspective (May 19, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript submitted as a draft paper to PLSC Europe) (on file with 
authors). 
15 See FED. TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REP., MOBILE PRIVACY 
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mentioned above, many of the companies behind the most 
popular mobile apps have been private companies, and a full 
understanding of their data collection practices and business 
models has been difficult.16 While mobile app companies may 
provide privacy policies to consumers, these have been found 
to be vague and ambiguous in terms of setting out a 
company’s data collection and use practices.17 The privacy-
invasive nature of Android and iOS smartphone apps 
received significant public attention through a report by the 
Wall Street Journal in its influential “What They Know” 
series.18 The investigation concluded that “[t]hese phones do 
not keep secrets. They are sharing [...] personal data widely 
and regularly.”19 Reports of regulators and studies of privacy 
disclosures by mobile apps continue to find a lack of 
transparency toward mobile users, ranging from a complete 
lack of a privacy policy to more specific omissions in such 
policies and the use of language that does not properly 
communicate data processing practices.20 Effectuating 
                                                 
DISCLOSURES: BUILDING TRUST THROUGH TRANSPARENCY 2, 3 (Feb. 2013); 
see also Jennifer M. Urban, et al., Mobile Phones and Privacy (UC 
Berkeley Public Law Research, Working Paper July 12, 2012), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103405.  
16 See Liccardi et al., supra note 6; Zang et al., supra note 6.  
17 See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches 
between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 
85 (2015) (discussing the ambiguity in privacy policy terms); see also Joel 
R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Policies and the Impact of 
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUDIES (SPECIAL ISSUE 2) 2 (2016). 
18 See Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, 
WALL ST. J., (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240 
52748704694004576020083703574602. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 15; 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 00461/13/EN, Opinion 
02/2013 on Apps on Smart Devices 27 (Feb. 27, 2013), 
https://www.pdpjournals.com/docs/88097.pdf; EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY 
FOR NETWORK & INFO. SECURITY, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN 
MOBILE APPLICATIONS, A STUDY ON THE APP DEVELOPMENT ECOSYSTEM 
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transparency in the mobile context is generally accepted to 
require a broader perspective than mere privacy policies.21  
In the U.S. context, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has been active in the area of mobile privacy, issuing 
guidance and recommendations for the industry.22 The FTC 
has done so in its role of enforcer of the U.S. consumer 
protection framework in relation to unfair and deceptive 
business practices and the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), which has been of specific 
relevance in the area of mobile apps.23 The FTC has 
conducted several investigations into the privacy relevant 
practices of mobile apps, for example its enforcement action 
against Snapchat.24 COPPA applies when an app knowingly 
                                                 
AND THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GDPR 19-20 (Nov. 2017); 
GLOBAL PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, RESULTS OF THE GLOBAL 
PRIVACY SWEEP 2014 (2014), https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/ 
GPEN_Summary_Global_Results_2014.pdf; FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, 
FPF MOBILE APPS STUDY 2 (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/2016-FPF-Mobile-Apps-Study_final.pdf. 
21 See Paula J. Bruening & Mary J. Culnan, Through a Glass Darkly: 
From Privacy Notices to Effective Transparency, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 515 
(2016).  
22 See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, 
The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 
590-604 (2014) (discussing the role of the FTC in the area of privacy law 
and policy).  
23 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-
6506 (2012); see also, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Two App 
Developers Settle FTC Charges They Violated Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/12/two-app-developers-settle-ftc-charges-they-violated-chil 
drens; Nico van Eijk et al., Unfair Commercial Practices: A 
Complementary Approach to Privacy Protection, 3 EUR. DATA PROTECTION 
L. REV. 325, 326 (2017). 
24 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges 
That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles 
-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were. 
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collects and uses the personal information of children under 
thirteen years of age. COPPA contains a specific provision on 
notice (§ 312.4) requiring an app to provide notice and obtain 
verifiable consent as soon as it collects personal information 
from children. A recent technical examination of 5,855 
Android apps for COPPA compliance found that a majority of 
these apps were potentially in violation of COPPA as a result 
of the use of third-party software development kits (SDKs).25 
Europe has taken a different approach to data privacy 
regulation than the U.S., anchoring protections in the 
fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal 
data, and maintaining a broadly applicable legal framework 
for the processing of personal data by private and public 
entities.26 European data privacy law, and the E.U.’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifically,27 has 
become an increasingly important reference point in U.S. 
data privacy discussions and practice.28 The widely discussed 
GDPR contains a detailed list of transparency obligations 
concerning the collection and use of personal data, including 
a right to access one’s personal data in Articles 12-15.29 The 
E.U.’s ePrivacy Directive contains more specific rules for the 
                                                 
25 Irwin Reyes et al., “Won’t Somebody Think of the Children?” Examining 
COPPA Compliance at Scale, 3 PROC. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECH. 63, 63 
(2018). 
26 See, e.g., BART VAN DER SLOOT ET AL., EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
BIG DATA 233 (Bart van der Sloot et al. eds., 2016). 
27 See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
(establishing the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC) [hereinafter General Data Protection 
Regulation]. 
28 See, e.g., Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s New Data Protection 
Rules Export Privacy Standards Worldwide, POLITICO, (Jan. 31, 2018, 
12:00 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-priv 
acy-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/; see also Anu 
Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 12, 23 (2012). 
29 See supra note 27. 
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electronic communications sector and the tracking of online 
users.30 A proposal for a replacement of the Directive by a 
new Regulation, including rules on privacy settings in 
browser and operating system software, is under debate in 
the European Parliament and the Member States.31  
Reviewing the scientific literature and existing regulatory 
documents discussed above, the issues at the intersection of 
privacy and transparency in relation to apps and mobile 
platforms can be summarized into the following four 
challenges: 
  
1. The extent to which and the conditions under 
which applications (obtain) access to personal 
information on users’ smartphones, including 
through smartphone sensors, and sensitive 
information stored on or available through the 
user’s device, such as health-related or location 
data. 
 
2. The lack of transparency about the use and 
associated privacy implications for mobile users, 
of third party services, toolkits, libraries and 
SDKs, for marketing and other purposes, 
including behavioral advertising, profiling, 
audience and customer analytics, fraud and 
security. 
 
3. The lack of and the challenges related to 
effective transparency about the further use of 
personal information, including profiling, 
personalization, artificial intelligence and the 
sharing of information with third parties. 
 
4. The design of the transparency architecture by 
the smartphone ecosystem, including the design 
                                                 
30 See Council Directive 2002/58/EC, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 42. 
31 See supra note 4. 
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and organization of app stores as well as the 
design of privacy notifications at installation, 
notifications during use of applications and the 
design and availability of settings related to the 
permissions given to particular applications. 
 
B.  Mobile Platforms and Mobile Privacy 
Governance 
 
Mobile platforms, or perhaps better, mobile ecosystem 
providers, have obtained a central role in the governance of 
the collection and use of personal information and the 
resolution (and creation) of specific data privacy issues. The 
term mobile platform is used here to refer to the combination 
of app stores and operating system of Apple (iOS) and Google 
(Android), respectively, offered in the smartphone market. In 
the case of Apple, the platform for the distribution of 
applications and the operating system are vertically 
integrated.32 In the case of Google’s Android (mobile) 
operating system and Google’s platform for getting access to 
applications, Google Play, the relationship between the two 
is more complicated.33 In principle, Android, as an open 
source operating system, is not directly managed by Google, 
but by respective mobile device manufacturers, such as 
Huawei or Samsung.34 There is some de facto vertical 
integration as a result of non-forking agreements between 
Google and device manufacturers resulting in the bundling 
of specific core apps to Android operating system 
installations (in particular Google Play).35 
                                                 
32 Ben Bajarin, Why Competing with Apple is So Difficult, Time, 
http://techland.time.com/2011/07/01/why-competing-with-apple-is-so-
difficult/. 
33 See infra note 35. 
34 Id. 
35 See European Commission Press Release IP/16/1492, Antitrust: 
Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android 
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The role of the mobile platforms is a complex one in 
which the collection and use of user data and related policies 
play a central role. Eaton et al. have examined the way in 
which Apple has managed access to specific “boundary 
resources” for application providers, including the control of 
customer data and customer privacy.36 Fong has examined 
the role of app intermediaries, i.e., the app stores, in 
protecting data privacy, recommending that the app stores 
use more of their leverage over apps to ensure respect for 
data privacy principles. Specifically, Fong suggests that app 
stores contractually require apps to offer users a right to 
access their data and abide by other international data 
privacy principles.37 There is a large and growing body of 
computer science literature on mobile privacy, including 
specific privacy-relevant aspects of the mobile operating 
system, such as security architectures, privacy permissions 
and notifications.38 In addition, user studies document the 
issues faced by users in understanding the privacy risks 
                                                 
Operating System and Applications (Apr. 20, 2016), http://europa. 
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm; see also Kent Walker, THE 
KEYWORD, Android: Choice at Every Turn (Nov. 10, 2016), 
https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/android-choice-competition-
response-europe/. 
36 Ben Eaton et al., Distributed Tuning of Boundary Resources: The Case 
of Apple's iOS Service System, 39 MIS QUARTERLY 217, 231–33 (2015).  
37 Adrian Fong, The Role of App Intermediaries in Protecting Data 
Privacy, 25 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 85, 108 (2017). 
38  See, e.g., Serge Egelman, et al., Choice Architecture and Smartphone 
Privacy: There’s A Price for That, THE ECON. INFO. SECURITY & PRIVACY 
211-36 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); Simon Meurer & Roland Wismüller, 
APEFS: An Infrastructure for Permission-Based Filtering of Android 
Apps, SECURITY & PRIVACY IN MOBILE INFO. & COMMC’N SYS. 1-11 
(Andreas U. Schmidt et al. eds., 2012); Ilaria Liccardi et al., No Technical 
Understanding Required: Helping Users Make Informed Choices About 
Access to Their Personal Data, 2014 PROC. ACM CONF. MOBILE & 
UBIQUITOUS SYS. 140, 140; Fuming Shih et al., Privacy Tipping Points in 
Smartphones Privacy Preferences, 2015 PROC. ACM CONFERENCE HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMP. SYS. 807, 807; see also supra note 6. 
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when using mobile platforms.39 Greene and Shilton 
conducted a critical discourse analysis of privacy discussions 
in Android and iOS developer forums, examining how privacy 
is defined among mobile application developers, and how 
mobile platforms, through technical or regulatory means, 
shape these definitions.40 Martin and Shilton document the 
importance of contextual factors for understanding mobile 
users’ privacy preferences and behavior and suggest that 
common practices in the mobile industry, such as harvesting 
and reusing location data, images, and contact lists, do not 
meet users’ privacy expectations.41 In the European context, 
Loos has examined the contractual relationship between 
mobile platforms, app developers and consumers.42  Scholars 
have also examined the app store review from a freedom of 
expression perspective.43  
In view of the power of platforms over other 
businesses, the European Commission has recently proposed 
new rules for platforms in an E.U. regulation on fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Jialiu Lin et al., Expectation and Purpose: Understanding 
Users' Mental Models of Mobile App Privacy Through Crowdsourcing, 
2012 PROC. ACM CONF. ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING; Norman Sadeh et 
al., Understanding and Capturing People's Privacy Policies in a Mobile 
Social Networking Application, 13 J. PERS. & UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
401, 402 (2009). 
40 See Greene & Shilton, supra note 3 (discussing the differences in 
provider’s definition of “privacy” and the ethical implications which arise 
as a result). 
41 Kirsten Martin & Katie Shilton, Putting Mobile Application Privacy in 
Context: An Empirical Study of User Privacy Expectations for Mobile 
Devices, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 200, 200, 211 (2016). 
42 Marco B. Loos, Standard Terms for the use of the Apple App Store and 
the Google Play Store, (Ctr. for the Study of European Contract L., 
Working Paper No. 2016-06 2016).   
43 See Luis E. Hestres, App Neutrality: Apple’s App Store and Freedom of 
Expression Online, 7 INT’L J. COMM. 1265, 1265 (2013). 
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services.44 The proposal seeks to cover app stores, and 
includes rules on terms and conditions, suspension and 
termination, ranking, differentiated treatment, complaint 
handling, and codes of conduct.45 Notably, Article 7 of the 
proposed regulation concerns information obligations with 
respect to how platforms structure access to data that is 
generated as a result of operating the platform.46 It provides 
that mobile platforms “shall include in their terms and 
conditions a description of the technical and contractual 
access, or absence thereof, of business users to any personal 
data or other data, or both, which business users or 
consumers provide for the use of the online intermediation 
services concerned or which are generated through the 
provision of those services.”47 In its preparation for the 
proposal, the European Commission organized workshops on 
trading practices between online platforms and business, 
including on data access, (re-)use and portability in the 
online platforms environment.48 
 
C.  SEC Disclosures, Privacy and Information 
Security 
 
The Securities Act of 1933,49 and the Securities Exchange Act 
                                                 
44 See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on Promoting Fairness and Transparency for Business 
Users of Online Intermediation Services, COM (2018) 238 final (Apr. 26, 
2018). 
45 Id. at arts. 3–6, 9–11.  
46 Id. at art. 7. 
47 Id.  
48 Commission Report of an Engagement Workshop On Business-to-
Business Relationships in the Online Platforms Environment – Data 
Access, (re-)use and Portability, at 1 COM (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/data-related-aspects-
business-platform-trading-practices-workshop-report. 
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa (2012). 
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of 1934,50 are the main legal instruments regulating the U.S. 
securities market. The primary purpose of the Securities Act, 
also known as the “truth in securities” law,51 is to ensure “full 
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold,” and to 
“prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”52 The Securities 
Exchange Act empowers the SEC to regulate the securities 
market, and as the SEC states,  its main purpose is to ensure 
that companies publicly offering securities “tell the public the 
truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling, 
and the risks involved in investing.”53 
In this regard, public offerings of securities will 
generally require the company to file a registration 
statement with the SEC.54 The registration statement, Form 
S-1, includes a disclosure document termed a prospectus, and 
the disclosure requirements in Form S-1 are set out in the 
SEC’s Regulation S-K.55 The Form S-1 must not only include 
financial information, such as determining the offering price, 
but also a detailed “description of business,”56 any “pending 
legal proceedings,” or “proceedings known to be contemplated 
by governmental authorities.”57 Moreover, Form S-1 must 
also include “risk factors,” which is a “discussion of the most 
significant factors that make the offering speculative or 
risky.”58 In 1998, the SEC adopted a Plain English rule for 
                                                 
50 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp (2012). 
51 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012). 
53  What We Do, SEC (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwe 
do.html. 
54 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012); WHITNEY DEBEVOISE & PENNY SOMER-GREIF, 
SECURITIES LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 503, 503–24 (Jean-Luc & Marcus Best eds., 
4th ed. 2005). 
55 17 C.F.R. § 229.500 (2018). 
56 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2018). 
57 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2018). 
58 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2018). 
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registration statements, which included that risk factors 
must be written in plain English and “avoid [. . .] ‘boilerplate’ 
explanations.”59 Registration statements filed are reviewed 
by SEC staff, and the SEC will usually issue a comment 
letter, and the issuer must respond within 30 days, and file 
an amendment to the registration statement where 
required.60 Notably, companies may be subject to criminal 
and civil liability for “material misstatements or omissions” 
in offering documents, including by SEC enforcement 
action.61  
In addition to filing the registration statement under 
the Securities Exchange Act, companies that have registered 
securities for a public offering are required to periodically file 
an annual report (Form 10-K), a quarterly report (10-Q), and 
to file a current report (Form 8-K) to disclose certain 
“material events”62 (such as bankruptcy, or “other events,” for 
example WhatsApp Inc.’s CEO leaving Facebook Inc.’s 
board).63 When a company files a disclosure form with the 
SEC, the disclosures must conform to the requirements 
under the SEC’s Regulation S-K,64 and Regulation S-X.65 The 
Form 10-K provides a comprehensive overview of the 
company's business and financial condition and includes 
audited financial statements, and must also include 
disclosures regarding a company's business and operations, 
risk factors, legal proceedings, management discussions and 
analysis of financial condition and results of operations, 
financial statements, disclosure controls and procedures, and 
corporate governance.66 Importantly, a company’s chief 
                                                 
59 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(b)(4) (2018). 
60 See Debevoise & Somer-Greif, supra note 54, at 505. 
61 Id. at 510. 
62 See Ferraro, supra note 9, at 314. 
63 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 8-K) 2 (Apr. 30, 2018). 
64 17 C.F.R. § 229.1111(h)(4) (2018). 
65 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(a)(1) (2018). 
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2012). 
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executive officer and chief financial officer must certify the 
material accuracy and completeness of the disclosures.   
In addition to the information expressly required by 
SEC regulations, a company is required to disclose “such 
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to 
make the required statements, in light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading.”67 The SEC 
considers omitted information to be “material” if there is a 
“substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider the information important in making an investment 
decision or that disclosure of the omitted information would 
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the total mix of information available.”68 
Notably, the SEC has recently adopted new guidance on 
public company cybersecurity disclosures in February 2018.69 
 Importantly, in addition to SEC enforcement action, 
which includes criminal and civil penalties, a company may 
also be sued for damages over material misstatement or 
omissions in disclosure documents. An example of SEC 
enforcement action would be Dell Inc.’s agreement in 2010 to 
pay a $100 million penalty,70 following an SEC complaint 
which charged Dell Inc. and its senior executives with filing 
materially false and misleading annual reports on its Forms 
10-K, and materially false and misleading quarterly reports 
on its Forms l0-Q.71 Indeed, in April 2018, the company 
formerly known as Yahoo Inc. paid a $35 million penalty to 
settle SEC charges that it filed “materially misleading” 
annual and quarterly reports for failing to disclose a user 
                                                 
67 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2018). 
68 Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company 
Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg. 8166, 8168 (Feb. 26, 2018). 
69 Id.   
70 Dell, Inc., Litigation Release No. 21599, 98 SEC Docket 3272, 3376 
(July 22, 2010). 
71 Complaint at 45-46, SEC v. Dell, Inc., No. 10-cv-1245 (RJL) (D.D.C. 
July 22, 2010). 
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data breach (affecting 500 million user accounts) for nearly 
two years.72 Further, an example of an investor suit would be 
the class action complaint filed in Yuan v. Facebook Inc. in 
March 2018 in response to the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal.73 The suit alleged that Facebook Inc. violated the 
Exchange Act by making “false and/or misleading 
statements” in its disclosures, including failing to disclose 
“Facebook violated its own purported data privacy policies by 
allowing third parties to access the personal data of millions 
of Facebook users without the users’ consent.”74 The class 
action followed reporting by The New York Times and The 
Observer of London that the voter-profiling company 
Cambridge Analytica had “harvested private information 
from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users 
without their permission,”75 with the investors claiming to 
have “suffered significant losses and damages” following the 
decline in the market value of Facebook Inc.’s shares after 
the revelations.76 In light of the scandal, it was reported that 
the SEC had opened an investigation into whether Facebook 
                                                 
72 Altaba, Inc., Release No. 10485 at 9-11 (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10485.pdf; Press Release, 
SEC, Altaba, Formerly Known as Yahoo!, Charged With Failing to 
Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees To Pay $35 Million (Apr. 
24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71. 
73 Complaint at 2, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01725 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
74 Id.  
75 Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultant Exploited the 
Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html; Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, 
Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge 
Analytica in Major Data Breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-
facebook-influence-us-election. 
76 Complaint at 4, Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:18-CV-01725 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
 Ó FATHAIGH, VAN HOBOKEN, & VAN EIJK 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 67 
 
Inc. had adequately disclosed to investors the risks 
associated with third parties accessing user data without 
consent.77   
 
II. A STUDY ON THE SEC FILINGS OF MOBILE APP 
COMPANIES 
 
To understand the dependence of mobile apps on mobile 
platforms, we conducted a study of the SEC filings of a set of 
U.S. public companies that predominantly operate their 
business, or important parts of their business, as a popular 
app in the mobile app environment. We constructed our 
selection of popular apps developed by publicly-traded 
companies on the basis of publicly available lists of top free, 
paid and grossing apps in the U.S. market.78 The companies 
                                                 
77 Dave Michaels & Georgia Wells, SEC Probes Why Facebook Didn’t 
Warn Sooner on Privacy Lapse, WALL ST. J.  (July 12, 2018, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-why-facebook-didnt-warn-
sooner-on-privacy-lapse-1531422043. 
78 See Table 1 in the article. In order to make this selection, we first 
compiled a chart of popular apps for each mobile ecosystem on the basis 
of publicly available lists of the top free, paid, and grossing apps that were 
available in Apple’s App Store, and Google Play store, on February 20, 
2018. The first app owned by a U.S. public company (or a subsidiary) from 
the first list of these two charts of apps (Apple’s App Store) was selected, 
e.g. Bitmoji (Snap, Inc.). Then the first app owned by another U.S. public 
company (or a subsidiary) from the first list of the second of these two 
charts (Google Play store) of apps was selected, e.g. Instagram (Facebook, 
Inc.) was selected. This method was repeated until a list of 10 U.S. public 
companies was reached. Given that a main purpose of the study was to 
see whether there is a dependence by mobile apps on mobile platforms, it 
was decided to examine Alphabet, Inc. and Apple, Inc. separately, and 
thus both these companies are not included in the list. Further, 
Amazon.com, Inc. and Microsoft Corporation were also not included, as 
an examination of their SEC filings revealed their mobile apps do not 
feature prominently. See also Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K) (Feb. 2, 2018); Microsoft Corp, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 2, 
2017).  
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selected are included in Table 1, along with each company’s 
IPO date.   
 
TABLE 1: LIST OF PUBLIC COMPANIES EXAMINED 
PUBLIC COMPANY POPULAR APPS (AND OTHER 
APPS OFFERED) 
IPO 
Snap Inc. Snapchat, Bitmoji 2017 
Facebook Inc. Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, 
Messenger 
2012 
Twitter Inc. Twitter (Periscope) 2013 
Match Group Inc. Tinder, OkCupid, PlentyOfFish 2015 
Pandora Media 
Group Inc. 
Pandora Music, Pandora 
Premium 
2011 
Zynga Mobile Inc. Zynga Poker, FarmVille,  2011 
Glu Mobile Inc. Taylor Swift, Kim Kardashian 2007 
Activision Blizzard 
Inc. 
Candy Crush Saga, Hearthstone 1993 
Electronic Arts 
Inc. 
Star Wars: Galaxy of Heroes, 
SimCity BuildIt 
1989 
Take-Two 
Interactive 
Software Inc. 79 
Grand Theft Auto, Dragon City, 
Monster Legends 
1997 
 
While the list of U.S. public companies for the study 
captures some of the most popular and top grossing apps in 
the Apple and Google mobile ecosystems, it should be noted 
that focusing on U.S. public companies to examine SEC 
                                                 
79 TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE INC., INVESTOR RELATIONS: 
CORPORATE PROFILE, http://ir.take2games.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=86428 
&p=irol-irhome (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
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filings means some popular mobile apps will not be covered. 
First, there are successful apps developed by U.S. private 
companies, such as Uber (Uber Technologies Inc.), and 
Pokémon Go (Niantic Inc.). Second, there are apps developed 
by non-U.S. public and private companies, such as Angry 
Birds (Rovio Entertainment Oy, Finland), Super Mario Run 
(Nintendo Co., Ltd., Japan), and Clash of Clans and Fortnite 
(Tencent Holdings Ltd., China). Further, the study does not 
examine apps by public companies that do not feature in the 
top-end of app store lists of popular apps, like the NYTimes 
app (The New York Times Company). Of course, some of the 
private and non-US companies may at some point become 
publicly-traded in the U.S., like Spotify (Spotify Technology 
S.A., Luxembourg), which became a “foreign private issuer” 
in March 2018.80  
The next stage in the study design was selecting the 
SEC filings to be examined. As mentioned above, there are 
three main types of regular filings made to the SEC by public 
companies, namely the annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 
10-Q, and current Form 8-K; in addition to the registration 
statement (Form S-1), which is filed when a company makes 
its IPO.81 The page length of these filings can be considerable. 
For example, when Twitter Inc. launched its IPO in 2013, its 
Form S-1 was 810 pages.82  
Similarly, Twitter’s 2017 annual filing (Form 10-K) 
was 115 pages, its 2017 fourth quarterly (Form 10-Q) was 75 
pages, while its eight current reports in 2017 (Form 8-K) 
averaged 30 pages each. Thus, to examine all filings made 
                                                 
80 Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) 52 (Feb. 
28, 2018); Ben Sisario & Matt Phillips, Spotify’s Wall Street Debut Is a 
Success, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/ 
business/media/spotifys-wall-street-debut-is-a-success.html. 
81 See supra Part I.C. 
82 Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Oct. 3, 2013), 
https://investor.twitterinc.com/node/8226/html.  
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with the SEC would have been considerably time-consuming, 
and it was therefore decided to develop the following 
methodology. First, each company’s Form S-1 was examined, 
as this filing contains the most elaborated business model 
description, and how a company might monetize personal 
information. Second, each company’s latest Form 10-K was 
examined, from which we worked backwards by year, 
examining each 10-K filing until 2008,83 or when the 
company went public (a majority of the companies examined 
went public after 2008), to see whether there had been 
changes relating to mobile platform governance changes.  
The SEC filings were examined with respect to four 
issues: (a) the stated role of user data in the company’s 
business model; (b) the stated role of data analytics in the 
company’s business model; (c) the stated dependency on 
mobile platforms; and (d) the stated risks associated with 
privacy regulation. 
 
A.  Monetization of User Data 
 
By examining the SEC filings across all the companies in the 
study, our first result is that the monetization of user data, 
and personal information in particular, is central to the 
business model of all the companies. Specifically, we found 
two business model variations within this monetization of 
user data model. The first variation is an advertising model, 
which is mainly used by Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc., Snap 
Inc., and Pandora Media Inc. The second variation is an in-
app purchasing model, which is mainly used by Match Group 
Inc., Zynga Inc., Glu Mobile Inc., Activision Blizzard Inc., 
                                                 
83 See Dan Rowinski, History of Mobile App Stores, READWRITE (Feb. 6, 
2012), 
https://readwrite.com/2012/02/06/infographic_history_of_mobile_app_sto
res/ (stating that in 2008, both Apple, Inc. (App Store) and Google, Inc. 
(Android Market) opened their mobile platforms to developers). 
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Electronic Arts Inc., and Take-Two Interactive Software Inc. 
 The crucial role of user data in the advertising model 
comes across clearly in the SEC filings of Twitter Inc., 
Facebook Inc., Snap Inc., and Pandora Media Inc. For 
example, for Twitter Inc., mobile advertising represented 
nearly 90 percent of Twitter’s total advertising revenue in 
2017, which was $2.4 billion.84 Twitter derives the majority 
of its advertising revenues from three products, which are 
Promoted Tweets, Promoted Accounts and Promoted 
Trends.85 However, the key factor in this advertising 
business model is that Twitter enables “our advertisers to 
target an audience based on a variety of factors,” including 
what Twitter calls a user’s “Interest Graph.”86 This Interest 
Graph “produces a clear and real-time signal of a user’s 
interests, greatly enhancing the relevance of the ads 
[Twitter] can display for users and enhancing [its] targeting 
capabilities for advertisers,”87 including the “location of the 
user,” a user’s follow relationships, combined with a “user’s 
activity on our platform, including who the user replies to, 
what Tweets the user favorites or retweets, links the user 
clicks,”88 and what the user tweets about. The centrality of 
monetizing user data can also be recognized in Twitter’s 
Form S-1, where it states that its “value proposition to 
advertisers” is its “ability to target ads based on our deep 
understanding of our users.”89  
Similarly, Facebook Inc.’s SEC filings revealed that 
88% of its revenue in 2017, totaling $40.6 billion, was 
generated from advertising on mobile devices.90 Similar to 
                                                 
84 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 42 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
85 Id. at 13.  
86 Id. at 6. 
87 Id.  
88 Twitter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 103 (Oct. 3, 2013). 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 43 (Feb. 1, 2018).  
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Twitter Inc., the key value for advertisers is Facebook Inc.  
enabling “marketers to reach people based on a variety of 
factors including age, gender, location, interests, and 
behaviors,”91 in addition to a user’s “education, work history, 
and specific interests that they have chosen to share with us 
on Facebook or by using the Like button around the web or 
on mobile devices.”92 Also similar to Twitter Inc.’s “Interest 
Graph” for advertisers, Facebook Inc. emphasizes that it 
enables advertisers to use a unique “Social Context” to 
enhance the value of ads, which is “information that 
highlights a user’s friends’ connections with a particular 
brand or business.”93 Finally, Facebook Inc. emphasizes its 
real-name policy to investors,94 stating that “authentic 
identity is core to the user experience on Facebook and users 
generally share information that reflects their real interests 
and demographics, we are able to deliver ads that reach the 
intended audience with higher accuracy rates compared to 
online industry averages.”95 
Pandora Media Inc., with its Pandora Music app, has 
a similar advertising business model built upon user data, 
disclosing in its SEC filings that it enables advertisers “to 
target and connect with listeners based on attributes 
including age, gender, zip code, and content preferences 
                                                 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).    
93 Id. at 3.    
94 Justin Osofsky & Todd Gage, Community Support FYI: Improving the 
Names Process on Facebook, FACEBOOK, INC. (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2015/12/community-support-fyi-
improving-the-names-process-on-facebook/. Facebook’s real-name policy 
has been controversial for its impact on privacy and marginalized 
communities in particular. See e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, Facebook 'Real 
Name' Policy Stirs Questions Around Identity, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:52 
PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/16/living/facebook-name-policy/ind 
ex.html. 
95 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).   
 Ó FATHAIGH, VAN HOBOKEN, & VAN EIJK 
Journal of Business & Technology Law 73 
 
using multi-platform ad campaigns to target their 
advertising messages to listeners.”96 Notably, Pandora Media 
Inc. also discloses that it offers advertisers Pandora Audience 
Targeting, where “advertising products have access to a set 
of over 2,000 targeting segments across all of our platforms,” 
including “Pandora’s inferred Spanish Speakers and Political 
Preference proprietary segments . . . targeting capabilities, 
which leverage listener submitted profile information, 
enabling advertisers to precisely reach sought-after 
consumers without needing third-party cookies.”97  
Thus, the advertising business model is built upon the 
ability to target users based on a variety of a user data such 
as age, gender, location, interests, friends, education, work 
history, and behavior. Given the centrality of user data to the 
advertising business model, it is little wonder that, as 
Facebook Inc. discloses, any changes which “limit our ability 
to deliver or target advertising on mobile devices” could 
“adversely affect” monetization on mobile devices.98  
While Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc., Snap Inc., and 
Pandora Media Inc. are mainly based on an advertising 
model,99 the remaining companies’ business models in our 
examination are predominantly based on in-app purchases, 
which also include in-app purchasing of premium features 
(e.g., Match Group Inc.’s dating app Tinder Plus or Tinder 
Gold).100 The first relevant feature of the in-app purchasing 
                                                 
96 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Feb. 13, 2017).  
97 Id. at 6.  
98 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 1, 2018). 
99 Companies may also combine an advertising and in-app purchasing 
model, such as Pandora Media, Inc., with nearly 20% of its revenue 
generated from subscriptions to its premium Pandora Plus app. See 
Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 52 (Feb. 16, 2017).  
100 See A Guide to Tinder: Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold, TINDER 
https://www.help.tinder.com/hc/en-us/articles/115004487406-Tinder-
Plus-and-Tinder-Gold (establishing that “Tinder Plus and Tinder Gold 
are in-app subscriptions offering access to premium features such as 
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model is that while these apps may have a very large number 
of users, only a very small percentage of users pay, and 
generate the majority of revenue. For example,  Glu Mobile 
Inc., which develops popular gaming apps, and generating 
“the majority of [its]  revenue from Apple’s iOS platform,”101 
discloses in its SEC filings that “the percentage of unique 
paying players for [its] largest revenue-generating free-to-
play games has typically been less than 2%.”102 Similarly, 
Zynga Inc., which also develops popular gaming apps, had 
revenues of $861 million in 2017, and 86 million monthly 
active users. However, it disclosed in its SEC filings that only 
2.4% of its monthly users are paying users.103 Thus, this is 
flagged as a particular risk, as Zynga Inc. relies “on a small 
portion of [its] total players for nearly all of our revenue.”104 
This means that in order to increase revenue, Zynga Inc.  
must “attract, retain and increase the number of paying 
players,” and “more effectively monetize” players, and 
“attract them to [its] other games.”105 This monetization of 
users is where user data and data analytics comes to the fore 
in the SEC filings of these companies. 
For example, Glu Mobile Inc. discloses that it makes 
“significant investments” in “proprietary analytics” and 
“monetization techniques” by “segmenting and learning more 
about the players of each of [its] franchises and further 
monetizing our highest spending and most engaged 
players.”106 Thus, “[Glu Mobile aims] to connect the data, 
insights and knowledge gained from [its] analytics and 
                                                 
Unlimited Likes, Passport to chat with singles anywhere around the 
world, ... With Tinder Gold, you also get exclusive access to our Likes You 
feature, which lets you see who likes you before you swipe.”). 
101 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 48 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
102 Id. at 21.  
103 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 20, 2018).   
104 Id.  
105 Zynga, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 31 (July 25, 2012).   
106 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
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monetization techniques” to “improve player retention and 
monetization.”107 Similarly, King Digital Entertainment 
PLC, which was acquired for $5.8 billion by Activision 
Blizzard Inc. in 2016,108 adopts a similar data-driven strategy 
to user monetization, disclosing that “[s]ophisticated 
targeting has transformed player acquisition,”109 and it runs 
“acquisition campaigns in a highly granular and data-driven 
way.”110 King Digital Entertainment PLC states that it has 
“built extensive analytics capabilities and proprietary 
technology infrastructure” to support “growth and retention 
of our audience through data-driven marketing and 
management of our games.”111  It adds that it runs  
“thousands of discrete campaigns every 24 hours, each with 
individual target metrics, and all subject to the same target 
return parameters.”112 In a similar vein, one of Zynga Inc.’s 
stated “core strengths” is its “[s]ophisticated data analytics,” 
with its “proprietary analytics and expertise in high volume 
data processing,” facilitating increased “engagement by [its] 
players and generate greater sales of virtual goods.”113  
Thus, the in-app purchasing model, similar to the 
advertising model, is built upon the ability to effectively 
engage users through data-driven monetization strategies, 
specifically converting non-paying users to paying users and 
optimizing the income from already paying users. Notably, 
companies primarily employing an in-app purchasing 
strategy may also choose in the future to use their user data 
sets in developing a stronger advertising model. For example, 
                                                 
107 Id.  
108 Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 27, 2018). 
109 King Digital Entertainment PLC, Registration Statement (Form F-1) 
83 (Feb. 18, 2014).  
110 Id. at 87.  
111 Id. at 83.  
112 Id. at 81. 
113 Zynga, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 72 (July 1, 2011); see 
also Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 2 (Feb. 20, 2018).  
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while Match Group Inc. currently derives most of its revenue 
“directly from users in the form of recurring subscriptions,”114 
it also explains that it has the ability “to monetize through 
advertising.”115 Thus, advertisers can “reach approximately 
59 million” monthly users, and Match Group Inc. offers 
“advertisers the ability to customize their advertisements 
based on analytics [it collects] about user interests and 
behavior.”116  
    
B.  Mobile Platform Dependencies  
 
Our study finds that nine out of the ten companies whose 
SEC filings we analyzed explicitly highlighted significant 
dependencies on mobile platforms and associated risks 
flowing from these dependencies.117 These dependencies were 
not uniform. We were able to identify a variety of 
dependencies on mobile platforms, including the challenge of 
interoperability of apps with mobile operating systems,118 
interoperability of apps with mobile device hardware,119 
                                                 
114 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 5 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
115 Match Group, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 4 (Oct. 16, 
2015). 
116 Id.  
117 Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. is the only company not to note 
its reliance on mobile platforms, but instead notes its reliance on video 
game platforms, such as Microsoft, Inc.’s Xbox Live and the Sony 
Corporation’s Sony Entertainment Network. See Take-Two Interactive 
Software, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (May 24, 2017). This may be 
explained by the fact that most of its revenue is derived from the “sale of 
products made for video game platforms . . . .” Id. 
118 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“We are 
dependent on the interoperability of our products and services with 
popular devices, desktop and mobile operating systems and web browsers 
that we do not control.”).  
119 See, e.g., Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Feb. 22, 2018) 
(Snapchat depends on effectively operating with mobile hardware, 
“including but not limited to mobile-device cameras.”). 
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access to app marketplaces,120 visibility and ranking of app 
in app marketplaces,121 mobile platforms’ in-app payment 
systems,122 delivery of advertising and targeted 
advertising,123 use of personal information for advertising,124 
access to mobile device identifiers,125 access to personal 
information of users,126 and use of data analytics software.127 
Indeed, as one company states, mobile platforms govern the 
“promotion, distribution, content and operation generally” of 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31 (Feb 23, 2018) 
(“We rely on application marketplaces, such as Apple’s App Store and 
Google’s Play, to drive downloads of our mobile applications.”).  
121 See, e.g., Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Feb. 26, 
2018) (“We . . . compete on the basis of the presence and visibility of our 
app . . . . The websites and mobile applications of our competitors may 
rank higher than our . . . app . . . which could draw potential listeners 
away from our service and toward those of our competitors.”).  
122 See, e.g., Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 13 (Mar. 1, 
2018) (“[P]urchases of these subscriptions and features are required to be 
processed through the in-app payment systems provided by Apple and, to 
a lesser degree, Google.”).  
123 See, e.g., Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018) 
(“[O]perating systems controlled by third parties increasingly contain 
features that allow device users to disable functionality that allows for 
the delivery of advertising on their devices.”). 
124 See, e.g., id. at 8 (explaining that a platform provider may “limit the 
use of personal information for advertising purposes[.]”).  
125 See, e.g., id. at 14 (“[W]hen Apple announced that UDID, a standard 
device identifier used in some applications, was being superseded and 
would no longer be supported, application developers were required to 
update their apps to utilize alternative device identifiers[.]”).  
126 See, e.g., Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 
27, 2018) (explaining that “business could be negatively impacted” if 
platform providers change “how the personal information of consumers is 
made available to developers”). 
127 See, e.g., Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 53 (Mar. 10, 
2017) ) (“[W]e rely on the data analytics software that we incorporate into 
our games to calculate and report the [operating metrics] of our 
games[.]”).  
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all apps on their platform.128 In the following paragraphs, we 
discuss these different types of dependencies observed in the 
SEC filings in more detail. 
First, in relation to the advertising business model, 
Facebook Inc. discloses that its monetization on mobile 
devices “depends upon” mobile platform standards “that 
[Facebook does] not control,” and any changes which “limit 
[its] ability to deliver” or “target” advertising could 
“adversely affect” monetization on mobile devices.129 
Similarly, Twitter Inc. discloses its reliance on mobile 
platforms, and that mobile platforms “may make changes” 
such as “limit [its] use of data to provide targeted 
advertising.”130 This dependency by companies adopting an 
advertising business model is particularly pronounced, given 
that a substantial majority of their revenue is derived from 
mobile advertising; including “[s]ubstantially all” of Snap 
Inc.’s revenue, such that an “inability to collect and disclose 
data” or “target the appropriate audience for advertisements” 
would “seriously harm our business.”131 
Second, similar to the advertising model, those 
companies using the in-app purchasing model also disclose 
significant dependences on mobile platforms related to the 
monetization of user data. For example, Zynga Inc. discloses 
its reliance on Apple’s App Store and the Google Play store, 
as 84% of revenue is derived from these platforms, and 
revenue is generated “primarily through the sale of in-game 
virtual items.”132 Mobile platforms have “broad discretion” to 
change and interpret its terms of service and other policies; 
and notably, if mobile platforms “change how the personal 
information of its users is made available to application 
                                                 
128 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 20, 2018).   
129 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018). 
130 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
131 Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12–13 (Feb. 22, 2018).  
132 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4, 6 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
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developers on the platform,”133 this could, as Zynga Inc. 
states, “adversely affect [its] business, financial condition or 
results of operations.”134 This emphasis on changes in access 
to personal information by mobile platforms is also made by 
Activision Blizzard Inc. It warns that if mobile platforms 
“change how the personal information of consumers is made 
available to developers,” its business “could be negatively 
impacted.”135  
Similarly, Glu Mobile Inc.,136 Electronic Arts Inc.,137 
and Match Group Inc.,138 all highlight the risks associated 
with their dependence on mobile platforms, including that 
Apple and Google have “significant influence over the 
products and services that [they] offer on their platforms,”139 
and that “Apple and Google can unilaterally change its 
standard terms and conditions with no prior notice to us,”140  
and have “broad discretion” to “interpret their respective 
terms and conditions in ways that may limit, eliminate or 
otherwise interfere with our ability to distribute our 
applications through their stores.”141 As Match Group Inc. 
                                                 
133 Id. at 8. 
134 Id. 
135 Activision Blizzard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 27, 
2018).  
136 See Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018) 
(“Apple and Google can unilaterally change its standard terms and 
conditions with no prior notice to us.”).  
137 Elec. Arts, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (May 24, 2017) (Apple’s 
App Store and Google’s Play Store “have significant influence over the 
products and services that we offer on their platforms.”).  
138 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Mar. 1, 2018) 
(Apple and Google have “broad discretion” to “interpret their respective 
terms and conditions in ways that may limit, eliminate or otherwise 
interfere with our ability to distribute our applications through their 
stores.”). 
139 Elec. Arts, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (May 24, 2017).  
140 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018).  
141 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
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ominously warns, there is “no assurance that Apple or Google 
will not limit or eliminate or otherwise interfere with the 
distribution of [its] applications,” and should they do so, 
“[Match Group’s] business, financial condition and results of 
operations could be adversely affected.”142 
While the preceding paragraphs revealed the level of 
dependency these companies have with regard to mobile 
platforms and the governance of personal information, our 
analysis of their SEC filings also reveals some of the concrete 
consequences for these companies where mobile platforms 
have unilaterally made changes to their platforms. 
Beginning with a notable case documented by Twitter Inc. in 
its filings in February 2018, it noted that because “a majority 
of [Twitter’s] users access our products and services through 
mobile devices,” it is “particularly dependent” on mobile 
platforms “in order to deliver . . . products and services.”143 In 
this regard, Twitter Inc. pointed to the detrimental impact of 
a change Apple made in 2017 to its mobile browser Safari’s 
integration with third-party applications including 
Twitter.144 This change resulted in a “decrease of 
approximately 2 million [monthly active users] who accessed 
Twitter by using registered third-party applications when 
those applications automatically contact [Twitter’s] servers 
for regular updates without discernible user-initiated 
action.”145 This statement referenced a privacy feature Apple 
introduced in iOS 11 in 2017 to both its desktop and mobile 
browser Safari 11.0, called Intelligent Tracking 
Prevention.146 Apple’s Intelligent Tracking Prevention blocks 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 See John Wilander, Intelligent Tracking Prevention, WEBKIT (June 5, 
2017), https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention. See 
also Stephen Wilmot, Apple Changes Business of Selling Your Browsing 
Data, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-
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cross-site tracking by removing “cookies and website data for 
sites with the ability to track users across-site.”147 Indeed, we 
cross-referenced this effect on Twitter Inc.’s user numbers by 
examining the SEC filings of the mobile advertising company 
Criteo S.A.148 Criteo S.A. noted that Apple’s Intelligent 
Tracking Prevention “blocks some or all third-party cookies 
by default on mobile” and “makes it more difficult for third-
party providers like Criteo to access data on Safari users.”149 
Criteo S.A. disclosed that the change had a “net negative 
impact” on its revenues in the third and fourth quarters of 
2017 of “$1.0 million and $25 million.”150   
A second notable case is related to the situation in 
which mobile platforms make changes to the possibility to 
use unique mobile device identifiers to track user behavior 
and deliver targeted advertising. Zynga Inc. notes that 
mobile platforms’ operating systems “increasingly contain 
features that allow device users to disable functionality that 
allows for the delivery of advertising on their devices,” and 
                                                 
changes-business-of-selling-your-browsing-data-1514127600. 
147 What’s New in Safari, 11.0, APPLE DEVELOPER PROGRAM, (last updated 
Feb. 22, 2018), https://developer.apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/ 
General/WhatsNewInSafari/Articles/Safari_11_0.html#//apple_ref/doc/ui
d/TP40014305-CH13-SW11 (enhancing user privacy by preventing cross-
site tracking). 
148 See Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2018). Criteo S.A. 
is a marketing technology company with 18,000 clients worldwide, and 
revenues of $2.2 billion in 2017. Id. at 1, 2. It helps “commerce companies 
and brand manufacturers acquire, convert and re-engage their 
customers, using shopping data, predictive technology and large 
consumer reach.” Id. at 126. See also Lara O’Reilly, Ad Tech Firm Criteo 
Says Apple’s New Ad Tracking Limiter Will Hit Its Revenue; Apple’s 
Intelligent Tracking Prevention Feature Makes it Harder for Ad Firms to 
Target Users, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ad-
tech-firm-criteo-says-apples-new-ad-tracking-limiter-will-hits-its-
revenue-1509549445. 
149 Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Mar. 1, 2018).  
150 Id. at 81.  
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discloses that if users “elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms 
in greater numbers, [its] ability to deliver effective 
advertising campaigns on behalf of [its] advertisers would 
suffer,” and could cause “[its] business, financial condition, or 
results of operations to suffer.”151 Zynga Inc. points to when 
Apple announced that its unique device identifier (UDID)152 
was “being superseded and would no longer be supported, 
application developers were required to update their apps to 
utilize alternative device identifiers such as universally 
unique identifier, or, more recently, identifier-for-
advertising, which simplify the process for Apple users to opt 
out of behavioral targeting.”153    
A third case relates to the recent controversy over the 
                                                 
151 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018).  
152 See App Programming Guide for iOS – Supporting User Privacy, 
APPLE, INC., (last updated Mar. 27, 2017) https://developer.apple. 
com/library/archive/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgra
mmingGuide/ExpectedAppBehaviors/ExpectedAppBehaviors.html#//app
le_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH3-SW2 (“If you have not already done so, 
stop using the unique device identifier (UDID) provided by the 
uniqueIdentifier [sic] property of the UIDevice class. That property was 
deprecated in iOS 5.0, and the App Store does not accept new apps or app 
updates that use that identifier.”). For a discussion on whether Google’s 
equivalent Android ID is “personally identifiable information,” see 
generally Ariel A. Pardee, Yershov v. Gannet: Rethinking the VPAA in the 
21st Century, 69 ME. L. REV. 251 (2017); Daniel L. Macioce, PII in Context: 
Video Privacy and a Factor-Based Test for Assessing Personal 
Information, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 331 (2018). 
153 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018). See also 
Sito Mobile Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Apr. 2, 2018) (“certain 
mobile devices allow users to “Limit Ad Tracking” on their devices. Like 
“Do Not Track,” “Limit Ad Tracking” is a signal that is sent by particular 
mobile devices when a user chooses to send such a signal. While there is 
no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon receiving such 
a signal, it is possible that customers, sellers, regulators, or future 
legislation may dictate a response that would limit our access to data, 
and consequently negatively impact the effectiveness of our solution and 
the value of our services on mobile devices.”). 
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use of  “loot boxes” in gaming apps,154 with Apple 
consequently changing its App Store Guidelines to require 
that apps “offering ‘loot boxes’ or other mechanisms that 
provide randomized virtual items for purchase must disclose 
the odds of receiving each type of item to customers prior to 
purchase.”155 Glu Mobile Inc. noted in its March 2018 SEC 
filings that “Apple updated its terms of service to require 
publishers to disclose a player’s odds of winning the various 
items contained within loot boxes.”156 Glu Mobile utilizes loot 
boxes “in many of its current games and the games it intends 
to release in 2018,”157 and is “in the process of complying with 
Apple’s new rules.”158 However, it also disclosed that it did 
not “currently believe that they will have a material impact 
on the monetization of [its] games that utilize loot boxes.”159 
Notably, Glu Mobile Inc. stated that if Apple changes its 
“terms of service to include more onerous requirements or if 
Apple (or Google) were to prohibit the use of loot boxes in 
games distributed on its digital platform,” it would “require 
[Glu Mobile] to redesign the economies of the affected games 
and would likely cause [its] revenues generated from these 
games to decline.”160 Similarly, Zynga Inc. highlighted the 
risk of Apple’s new policy, and that it is “continuing to 
evaluate how Apple will interpret this revision,” and “how 
this rule may affect [its] business, operations and financial 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Ben Kuchera, Apple Adds New Rules for Loot Boxes, Requires 
Disclosure of Probabilities, POLYGON, (Dec. 21, 2014, 9:44 AM), 
https://www.polygon.com/2017/12/21/16805392/loot-box-odds-rules-
apple-app-store. 
155 App Store Review Guidelines—Section 3.1.1 In-App Purchases, APPLE, 
INC., https://developer.apple.com/app-store/review/guidelines/ (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2018).     
156 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 36. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
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results.”161 Notably Zynga Inc. flagged the risk and 
uncertainty about “whether Google, Facebook and other 
platform providers adopt similar rules.”162 
A fourth case we documented through our analysis 
concerns mobile platform making changes to rules on in-app 
rewards for advertising viewing and app installs.163 A 
company Glu Mobile, Inc. was specifically affected by these 
rule changes; the company noted that in 2011 Apple began 
prohibiting virtual currency-incented advertising offers in 
games that directed users to download other applications 
from Apple’s App Store in order to complete the offer.164 Glu 
Mobile Inc. stated that “[t]hese offers accounted for 
approximately one-third of [its] revenue during the three 
months ended September 30, 2011, and [its] inability to use 
such offers has negatively impacted [its] revenue.”165 In 
addition, Glu Mobile Inc. also noted in its SEC filings that in 
2014 “there were reports that Apple was considering 
prohibiting certain types of virtual currency-incented video 
advertising in games that promoted other applications 
available on the Apple App Store.”166 Glu Mobile Inc. 
disclosed that “incented video advertisements generate a 
meaningful percentage of [its] overall revenue, and any 
prohibition of these advertisements would have had a 
                                                 
161 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
162 Id. 
163 Jason Kincaid, Apple Clamps Down On Incentivized App Downloads, 
TECHCRUNCH  (Apr. 19, 2011) https://beta.techcrunch.com/2011/04/19/ 
apple-clamps-down-on-incentivized-app-downloads/. See also Sarah 
Perez, Apple Begins Rejecting Apps That Offer Rewards For Video Views, 
Social Sharing, TECHCRUNCH (June 9, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/ 
2014/06/09/apple-begins-rejecting-apps-that-offer-rewards-for-video-
views-social-sharing/. 
164 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 29 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
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negative impact on [its] revenue.”167   
A fifth case is related to the use of certain software for 
tracking advertising metrics. Glu Mobile Inc. stated that in 
2014, Facebook Inc., in its capacity as a platform for 
Facebook apps, had “prohibited HasOffers, whose software 
development kit [Glu Mobile] had incorporated into [its] 
games to track advertising metrics, from participating in 
Facebook’s mobile measurement program.”168 It was stated 
that Facebook asserted HasOffers violated its agreement 
with Facebook.169 Glu Mobile said that it removed HasOffers’ 
software development kit from their games and “replaced it 
with software from a new vendor, which did not adversely 
impact [its] revenue or operations.”170 Notably, Glu Mobile 
disclosed that any “similar changes or prohibitions in the 
future, including any changes by Facebook of its advertising 
platform, which [it relies] on for a majority of [its] user 
acquisition activities, could negatively impact [its] revenue 
or otherwise materially harm [its] business, and [Glu Mobile] 
may not receive significant or any advance warning of 
                                                 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 22.  
169 See Ben Kepes, Holy Ban Batman - Facebook Takes Privacy Seriously 
And Bans Sketchy Partner, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2014, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benkepes/2014/02/12/holy-ban-batman-
facebook-takes-privacy-seriously-and-bans-sketchy-
partner/#25cfc2fb5b5b. See also Elizabeth Dwoskin & Tony Romm, 
Facebook’s Rules for Accessing User Data Lured More Than Just 
Cambridge Analytica, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2018),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-rules-for-
accessing-user-data-lured-more-than-just-cambridge-analytica/2018/03/ 
19/31f6979c-658e-43d6-a71f-afdd8bf1308b_story.html?utm_term=.b9d7 
d3e0e34a (“In 2014, Facebook blocked two advertising partners, 
HasOffers and Kontagent, for violating policies on retaining customer 
data and failing to notify partner companies about their data collection 
practices.”). 
170 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
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such.”171 
A sixth case concerns some companies that noted a 
particular reliance on Facebook Inc., such as Match Group 
Inc.’s Tinder app, where up until 2017, “users currently 
register for (and log in to) the application exclusively through 
their Facebook profiles.”172 Match Group Inc. warned that 
“Facebook has broad discretion to change its terms and 
conditions applicable to the use of its platform and to 
interpret its terms and conditions in ways that could limit, 
eliminate or otherwise interfere with [Match Group’s] ability 
to use Facebook as an authentication method.”173 Relatedly, 
Zynga Inc.’s filings in 2014 revealed its dependence on 
Facebook Inc., noting that 75% of its revenue was derived 
from Facebook users174 (in contrast to 2017, with only 12% 
from Facebook, and 51% from Apple).175 Zynga Inc. stated 
that its agreement “obligated [Zynga] to use Facebook 
Credits as the sole in-game payment mechanism in any 
games launched on [its] own social gaming network, and 
entitled Facebook to retain 30% of the stated price for 
transactions on [Zynga’s] network.”176 Further, Zynga Inc. 
disclosed that it was “limited in [its] ability to use a Facebook 
user’s friends list and Facebook’s communication channels to 
promote Zynga.com,” and “Facebook amended its standard 
terms of service to prohibit (i) apps on the Facebook canvas 
from promoting or linking to game sites other than Facebook 
and (ii) the use of emails obtained from Facebook to promote 
or link to desktop web games on platforms other than 
Facebook.”177 Notably, Zynga Inc. was “prohibited from cross-
                                                 
171 Id. 
172 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Feb. 28, 2017).  
173 Id.  
174 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 21, 2014).  
175 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
176 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 21, 2014). 
177 Id. at 9. 
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promoting traffic to games that are offered on platforms other 
than Facebook from our games on Facebook,” and it was “not 
permitted to use e-mail addresses obtained from Facebook to 
promote desktop web games that are not on the Facebook 
platform, subject to certain limited exceptions.”178 In its 
latest filings in 2018, Zynga Inc. stated its main reliance is 
now on Apple Inc. and Google’s mobile platforms, generating 
84% of its revenue.179  
Beyond these six cases, there are a number of other 
potential changes by mobile platforms that we identified that 
are worth briefly listing to further demonstrate the 
dependency on mobile platforms. These include platforms 
imposing file size limitations, which may limit the ability of 
users to download large apps in over-the-air updates,180 
changing app age-ratings methodology,181 changing fees 
related to the distribution of app or delivery of ads,182 and 
imposing updated software requirements.183    
                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 4 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
180 Id. at 8 (“platforms also impose certain file size limitations, which may 
limit the ability of players to download some of our larger games in over-
the-air updates.”). See Sarah Perez, Apple Bumps Up the Over-the-Air 
Download Limit for Apps to 150 MB, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/20/apple-bumps-up-the-the-over-the-air-
download-limit-for-apps-to-150-mb/.  
181 Glu Mobile, Inc., Registration Statement (Form 424B3) 6 (Nov. 7, 
2014) (“Most recently, in the second quarter of 2014, Apple changed its 
game rating methodology which has resulted in all of our games that 
include gun violence receiving a 17+ rating, which could potentially 
negatively impact the number of people playing these “shooter” games 
and the revenues we generate from these games.”). 
182 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 1, 2018).  
183 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 22 (Mar. 9, 2018) (“Apple 
informed developers that beginning on February 1, 2015 all new 
applications, and beginning June 1, 2015 all updates to existing 
applications, submitted to the Apple App Store must include 64-bit 
support. Building our games to support 64-bit development has increased 
the file sizes of our games making it more difficult for players to download 
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C.  Privacy Regulation  
 
We specifically analyzed the disclosures made in relation to 
privacy regulations in SEC filings to document the growing 
economic importance of privacy regulations and changes to 
them. All the companies examined disclosed as risk factors 
their compliance with laws on privacy and data protection,184 
security,185 government investigations,186 regulatory 
enforcement actions and settlements.187 This flows from the 
fact that, as Twitter Inc. and Facebook Inc. explicitly state, 
laws on privacy, data protection, and personal information 
“involve matters central to [their] business[es].”188 In this 
regard, there were a number of notable disclosures that merit 
highlighting.  
First, a number of companies make disclosures 
                                                 
our games and potentially negatively impacting the number of downloads 
and active users of our titles, particularly for those games where we are 
unable to keep file sizes below 150 megabytes.”). 
184 Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 
(May 24, 2017).  
185 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
186 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 1, 2018). 
187 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“In March 
2011, to resolve an investigation into various incidents, we entered into a 
settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission, or FTC, that, 
among other things, required us to establish an information security 
program designed to protect non-public consumer information and also 
requires that we obtain biennial independent security assessments.”). 
188 Id. at 9 (“We are subject to a number of U.S. federal and state and 
foreign laws and regulations that involve matters central to our business. 
These laws and regulations may involve privacy, rights of publicity, data 
protection[.]”). See also Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 
(Feb. 1, 2018) (“We are subject to a variety of laws and regulations in the 
United States and abroad that involve matters central to our business, 
including privacy, data protection and personal information, rights of 
publicity, content, intellectual property, advertising, marketing, 
distribution, [and] data security[.]”).  
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relating to previous regulatory action taken against the 
companies over privacy and user data issues, including all 
three companies mainly operating an advertising business 
model. For example, Snap Inc. states that in 2015, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “resolved an investigation 
into some of [its] early practices by issuing a final order.”189 
The order required that Snap Inc. “establish a robust privacy 
program to govern how [Snap treats] user data,” and during 
the “20-year term of the order, [it] must complete bi-annual 
independent privacy audits.”190 It notes that violating these 
orders “could subject [the company] to substantial monetary 
fines and other penalties that could seriously harm [its] 
business.”191 Similarly, Twitter Inc. also discloses regulatory 
investigations and settlements could cause it to “change [its] 
business practices in a manner materially adverse to [its] 
business.”192 It gives the example of a 2011 settlement with 
the FTC which “required [Twitter] to establish an 
information security program designed to protect non-public 
consumer information and also requires that [it] obtain 
biennial independent security assessments,” with the 
obligations under the settlement agreement remaining in 
effect until 2031.193 
Along with Snap Inc. and Twitter Inc., Facebook Inc.’s 
registration statement (Form S-1), filed in February 2012, 
also disclosed that it has been subject to “regulatory 
investigations and settlements,” and “[it] expect[s] to 
continue to be subject to such proceedings in the future,” and 
which could “require [Facebook to] change [its] business 
practices in a manner materially adverse to [its] business.”194 
                                                 
189 Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 22, 2018).  
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
193 Id. 
194 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 19 (Feb. 1, 2012).    
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Facebook Inc. pointed to an agreement with the FTC made 
four months earlier “to resolve an investigation into various 
practices by entering into a 20-year settlement agreement 
that, among other things, requires [it] to establish and refine 
certain practices with respect to treatment of user data and 
privacy settings and also requires that [Facebook] complete 
bi-annual independent privacy audits.”195 Facebook Inc. 
made the same disclosure about the FTC settlement in its 
Form 10-K in 2013,196 2014,197 and 2015.198 However, it did 
not include this disclosure in its Form 10-K in 2016, 2017, 
nor in February 2018. In March 2018, following reporting by 
The New York Times and The Observer of London that a 
voter-profiling company had “harvested private information 
from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users 
without their permission,”199 the FTC confirmed it had again 
opened an investigation into Facebook Inc.’s privacy 
practices.200 Then, in its Form 10-Q filed in late April 2018,201 
Facebook Inc. disclosed it had become subject to FTC and 
other government inquiries in the U.S., Europe, and other 
jurisdictions “in connection with the misuse of certain data 
by a developer that shared such data with third parties in 
                                                 
195 Id.; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC 
Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing To Keep Privacy 
Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-
failing-keep. 
196 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Feb. 1, 2013).  
197 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 11 (Jan. 31, 2014).  
198 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 7 (Jan. 29, 2015).  
199 Rosenberg et al., supra note 75; see also Cadwalladr & Graham-
Harrison, supra note 75. 
200 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement by the Acting Director 
of FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection Regarding Reported Concerns 
about Facebook Privacy Practices (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2018/03/statement-acting-director-ftcs-
bureau-consumer-protection. 
201 Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 26, 2018).  
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violation of our terms and policies,” and enforcement action 
“could cause [it] to incur substantial costs, expose [it] to 
unanticipated civil and criminal liability or penalties 
(including substantial monetary fines), or require [it] to 
change [its] business practices in a manner materially 
adverse to [its] business.”202 In addition, a further risk now 
arose, as Facebook Inc. had been the “subject of intense 
media coverage involving the misuse of certain data by a 
developer that shared such data with third parties in 
violation of [Facebook’s] terms and policies,” and such 
negative publicity could have an “adverse effect on the size, 
engagement, and loyalty of [its] user base and result in 
decreased revenue.”203   
Second, all the companies disclose risks not only 
associated with U.S. laws and regulations, but also foreign 
laws such as the E.U.’s GDPR,204 which may “significantly 
affect” their business.205 In its February 2018 filings, three 
months before the E.U. law came into effect, Facebook Inc. 
stated that the law “will apply to all of [its] products and 
services that provide service in Europe,” and includes 
“operational requirements for companies that receive or 
process personal data of residents of the European Union 
that are different than those currently in place.”206 Notably, 
Facebook Inc. gives two examples of changes that may occur, 
namely implementing “measures to change [its] service or 
limit access to [its] service for minors under the age of 16 for 
certain countries in Europe,” and also be “required to obtain 
consent and/or offer new controls to existing and new users 
in Europe before processing data for certain aspects of our 
                                                 
202 Id. at 49.  
203 Id. at 46.  
204 See supra note 27, at 5. 
205 Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Feb. 1, 2018).  
206 Id. 
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service.”207 In its accompanying call to its Form 10-Q filing in 
April 2018, Facebook Inc. did indicate European monthly and 
daily users “may be flat to slightly down sequentially in Q2 
as a result of the GDPR roll out,” but did “not anticipate these 
changes will significantly impact advertising revenue.”208 
 While Facebook Inc. provides some level of specificity 
regarding changes as a result of the GDPR, Pandora Media 
Inc. disclosed that the GDPR “will require” implementation 
of “do not track” mechanisms and “requirements that users 
affirmatively ‘opt-in’ to certain types of data collection and 
use.”209 This could “significantly hinder [its] ability to collect 
and use data relating” to users. As such, restrictions on 
Pandora Media Inc.’s ability to “collect, access and harness 
listener data,” or “disclose listener data or any profiles that 
[it] develop[s] using such data,” could limit its ability to 
stream personalized music content and offer “targeted 
advertising opportunities to [its] advertising customers,” 
which are “critical to the success of [its] business.”210    
Third, the SEC filings reveal the relationship between 
regulation and mobile platform governance. For example, 
and as mentioned above, Apple changed its App Store Review 
Guidelines in December 2017 concerning loot boxes. Notably, 
some companies recognized that the changes made would not 
“have a material impact on the monetization of [its] games 
that utilize loot boxes.”211 However, while also warning about 
the risk to its business if Apple adopted “more onerous” 
requirements, there was also the added risk that various 
jurisdictions212 were reviewing “the legality of loot boxes and 
                                                 
207 Id. 
208 Facebook, Inc., First Quarter 2018 Results Conference Call 
(Transcript) 8 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investor-
events/event-details/2018/Facebook-Q1-2018-Earnings/default.aspx.  
209 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Feb. 26, 2018).  
210 Id. 
211 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 36 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
212 See id. (discussing stringent jurisdictions such as Australia, Belgium, 
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whether they constitute gambling.”213 In particular, if other 
jurisdictions determine that loot boxes “constitute gambling 
or they otherwise elect to regulate the use of loot boxes, it 
could require [these companies] to stop utilizing loot boxes 
within [their] games that are distributed in such territories, 
which would negatively impact [their] revenues.”214 
Fourth, the influence of regulatory action concerning 
mobile platforms, and the consequences for app companies, 
was also a feature of the SEC filings. For example, COPPA 
requires companies to obtain parental consent before 
collecting personal information from children under the age 
of 13.215 Glu Mobile Inc. discussed the FTC’s settlement with 
Apple Inc. in 2014 related to in-app purchases made by 
minors; and in 2016, the FTC’s successful lawsuit against 
Amazon.com Inc., with a Federal District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of the FTC, finding Amazon 
liable for unfairly billing consumers for unauthorized in-app 
purchases by minors.216 Glu Mobile Inc. stated that “if [it 
does] not follow existing laws and regulations, as well as the 
rules of the smartphone platform operators, concerning 
privacy-related matters, or if consumers raise any concerns 
about [its] privacy practices, even if unfounded, it could 
damage [its] reputation and operating results.”217       
Finally, we found a number of remaining issues 
related to privacy regulations that were highlighted in the 
SEC filings. These included (a) warnings that the application 
of privacy and data protection laws are often being “unclear,” 
                                                 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the states of Hawaii and 
Washington). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2000). 
216 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20–21 (Mar. 9, 2018); see 
also FTC v. Amazon Inc., No. C14-1038-JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
55569, at *1–25 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2016). 
217 Glu Mobile, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
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with “conflicting” interpretations and applications;218 (b)  
companies explicitly stating that they are “bound by our 
public-facing privacy statement,” which “sets forth the ways 
in which we collect, use and share information”;219 (c) risks 
associated with proposed legislation, such as the E.U.’s 
proposed e-Privacy Regulation,220 which will “notably” 
amend the “rules on the use of cookies”;221 (d) COPPA,222 with 
companies such as Zynga Inc. disclosing that compliance 
involves “significant operational resources” and “significant 
expenses”;223 and (e) the reliance some companies have on the 
international transfer of personal information, such as 
Twitter Inc. disclosing its reliance “on a variety of legal bases 
to transfer certain personal information outside of the 
European Economic Area,”224 including the E.U.-U.S. Privacy 
Shield,225 and E.U. Standard Contractual Clauses.226  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
218 Id. (“[I]nterpreting and applying data protection laws to the mobile 
gaming industry is often unclear. These laws may be interpreted and 
applied in conflicting ways from state to state, country to country, or 
region to region, and in a manner that is not consistent with our current 
data protection practices.”).  
219 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23 (Feb. 26, 2018).  
220 Match Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Mar. 1, 2018).  
221 Id. 
222 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 
(2012). 
223 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 12 (Feb. 20, 2018).  
224 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
225 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, of 12 July 2016 
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 1 (EU). 
226 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
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III. MOBILE DEPENDENCIES AND PRIVACY 
 
A.  The Value of SEC Filings 
 
First, our findings suggest that in order to understand the 
actual impact of a change to a mobile platform’s data privacy 
governance, whether imposed by a platform as a result of a 
policy decision, or as a direct or indirect result of data privacy 
regulations, SEC filings can provide evidence of the specific 
impact on a company’s business model and data collection 
practices. Some of the most significant impacts highlighted 
in the findings included the impact on Twitter Inc. following 
Apple Inc.’s introduction of allowing mobile users to prevent 
cross-site tracking, resulting in a decrease of 2 million 
monthly average users accessing Twitter through third-party 
applications.227 Further, the impact of the change for a major 
mobile advertising company was quantified as having had a 
“net negative impact” on revenue in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2017 of “$1.0 million and $25 million.”228 
 Second, the SEC findings can also demonstrate 
whether a privacy governance change may not be 
considerably effective. For example, app companies recognize 
the trend of mobile platform software “increasingly” 
containing features that “allow device users to disable 
functionality that allows for the delivery of advertising on 
their devices,”229 such as Apple’s Limit Ad Tracking,230 and 
                                                 
227 Id. at 18.  
228 Criteo S.A., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 81 (Mar. 1, 2018). 
229 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
230 iPhone User Guide For iOS 6.1 Software, APPLE, INC., 134 (2013), 
https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1658/en_US/iphone
_ios6_user_guide.pdf (“Restrict or reset Ad Tracking: Go to Settings > 
General > About > Advertising. Turn on Limit Ad Tracking to prevent 
apps from accessing your iPhone’s advertising identifier. For more 
information, tap Learn More.”). 
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Reset Advertising Identifier control introduced in iOS 6.231 
However, SEC disclosures reveal difficulties with such 
mechanisms, with one company noting that while the Limit 
Ad Tracking is a signal that is sent by particular mobile 
devices when a user chooses to send such a signal, “there is 
no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon 
receiving such a signal.”232 Further, SEC disclosures can 
indicate that users choosing to turn these controls on may be 
low, and only if users “elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms 
in greater numbers, [companies’] ability to deliver effective 
advertising campaigns on behalf of [their] advertisers would 
suffer.”233 Thus, effectiveness of certain privacy enhancing 
controls introduced by mobile platforms can be assessed from 
SEC disclosures, in particular in how such controls may 
affect an app company’s business. This also raises the issue 
of circumventing mobile platforms controls, and it should be 
remembered that in 2012, “Google Inc. . . . agreed to pay a 
record $22.5 million civil penalty to settle [FTC] charges that 
it misrepresented to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet 
browser that it would not place tracking ‘cookies’ or serve 
targeted ads to those users.”234  
                                                 
231 iOS SDK Release Notes for iOS 6.1, APPLE, INC. (Jan. 28, 2013), 
https://developer.apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/General/RN-
iOSSDK-6_1/index.html. 
232 Sito Mobile, Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 20 (Apr. 2, 2018) 
(“[C]ertain mobile devices allow users to ‘Limit Ad Tracking’ on their 
devices. Like ‘Do Not Track,’ ‘Limit Ad Tracking’ is a signal that is sent 
by particular mobile devices when a user chooses to send such a signal. 
While there is no clear guidance on how third parties must respond upon 
receiving such a signal, it is possible that customers, sellers, regulators, 
or future legislation may dictate a response that would limit our access 
to data, and consequently negatively impact the effectiveness of our 
solution and the value of our services on mobile devices.”). 
233 Zynga, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 14 (Feb. 20, 2018). 
234 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to 
Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of 
Apple's Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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Third, we found evidence that SEC filings tend to 
reveal more contextual information concerning a company’s 
use of personal information, in particular relating to how 
data is monetized, than the information contained in a 
company’s privacy policy. For example, Twitter Inc.’s user 
“Interest Graph,” Facebook Inc.’s “Social Context,” or 
Pandora Media Inc.’s  “Pandora Audience Targeting,” which 
each company highlights to investors, are not specifically 
mentioned in company privacy policies.235 In relation to its 
“Interest Graph,” Twitter Inc. emphasizes how it “produces a 
clear and real-time signal of a user’s interests, greatly 
enhancing the relevance of the ads [it] can display for users 
and enhancing [its] targeting capabilities for advertisers.”236 
On the other hand, Twitter Inc.’s privacy policy states that it 
may “make inferences like what topics you may be interested 
in. . . and personalize the content [it] show[s customers], 
including ads.”237 In a similar vein, Facebook Inc. emphasizes 
its real-name policy to investors,238 stating that as “authentic 
identity is core to the user experience on Facebook and users 
generally share information that reflects their real interests 
and demographics, [Facebook is] able to deliver ads that 
reach the intended audience with higher accuracy rates 
compared to online industry averages.”239 In its privacy 
policy, Facebook Inc. merely states that it does not “share 
information that personally identifies you,” such as a name, 
                                                 
events/press-releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-
charges-it-misrepresented. 
235 See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, INC. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www. 
facebook.com/about/privacy/; see also Pandora Privacy Policy, PANDORA 
MEDIA, INC. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.pandora.com/privacy; Twitter 
Privacy Policy, TWITTER, INC. (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com 
/en/privacy. 
236 Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6 (Feb. 23, 2018).  
237 See Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 235. 
238 Osofsky & Gage, supra note 94.  
239 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 76 (Feb. 1, 2012).   
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with “advertising, measurement or analytics partners unless 
you give [Facebook] permission.”240 In 2015, Facebook Inc. 
explained that its real-name policy was designed to make 
users “more accountable,” and prevent bullying, anonymous 
harassment, scamming and criminal behavior.241   
Fourth, our study shows that SEC disclosures may 
reveal information not included in privacy policies, such as a 
company’s concerns over a mobile platform simplifying the 
process for users to opt out of behavioral targeting, and 
should “users elect to utilize the opt-out mechanisms in 
greater numbers, our ability to deliver effective advertising 
campaigns on behalf of our advertisers would suffer, which 
could cause our business, financial condition, or results of 
operations to suffer.”242 Similarly, a mobile app company’s 
SEC disclosures may reveal specific information cornering 
problematic data analytics software used, such as Glu Mobile 
Inc.’s concern over Facebook prohibiting the HasOffers 
software development kit, which “[it] had incorporated into 
[its] games to track advertising metrics,” and “any similar 
changes or prohibitions in the future could negatively impact 
[its] revenue or otherwise materially harm [its] business, and 
[Glu Mobile] may not receive significant or any advance 
warning of such changes.”243 
Fifth, SEC disclosures include previous and ongoing 
regulatory action concerning privacy issues, which may not 
be included in a company’s privacy policy. As such, SEC 
disclosures are an interesting source of information for 
privacy law and policy research, providing references to 
regulatory issues and past and ongoing litigation. For 
example, Snap Inc. discloses in its SEC filings that the FTC 
                                                 
240 Data Policy, FACEBOOK, INC. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.facebook. 
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241 Osofsky & Gage, supra note 94. 
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issued a final order in 2014, requiring Snap Inc. to “establish 
a robust privacy program to govern how [it] treat[s] user 
data,” and “complete bi-annual independent privacy audits,” 
under the 20-year order.244 Snap Inc. also discloses how it 
entered a 10-year assurance of discontinuance with the 
Attorney General of Maryland implementing similar privacy 
practices, including measures to prevent minors under the 
age of 13 from creating accounts.245 The FTC complaint 
included that Snap Inc. misrepresented its data collection 
practices, and Snapchat transmitted geolocation information 
from users of its Android app, despite saying in its privacy 
policy that it did not track or access such information.246 
Snapchat collected iOS users’ contacts information from their 
address books without notice or consent.247 Snapchat 
continued to collect this information without notifying or 
obtaining users’ consent until Apple modified its operating 
system to provide such notice with the introduction of iOS 
6.248 An open question is whether consumers should also be 
made aware that a company is subject to a 20-year FTC 
order, and subject to bi-annual privacy audits. This question 
also raises a point directly related to platform governance: 
the effect mobile platform changes have in terms of ending 
certain data collection practices that may later lead to 
                                                 
244 Snap, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 22, 2018).  
245 Id.  
246 Complaint at 5, In re Snapchat, Inc., (F.T.C. No. 132-3078), 2014 WL 
7495798 at *3. 
247  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges 
That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-
settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were. 
248 Id.; see also What’s New in iOS 6.0, APPLE, INC., https://developer. 
apple.com/library/content/releasenotes/General/WhatsNewIniOS/ 
Articles/iOS6.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40011812-SW7 (describing the 
changes made in relation to data privacy in iOS 6) (last visited Oct. 18, 
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regulatory action.       
The Snap Inc. example is quite illustrative: the FTC’s 
complaint stated that prior to September 2012, the Snapchat 
app collected “not only the phone number a user enters, but 
also, without informing the user, the names and phone 
numbers of all the contacts in the user’s mobile device 
address book.”249 Thus, the changes Apple Inc. made in 
September 2012 to its operating system in iOS 6 had a direct 
effect on the Snap Inc.’s data collection methods, two years 
before the FTC’s final order was adopted.250 In iOS 6, the 
operating system required a user’s permission before 
allowing third-party apps access a mobile device’s contacts, 
calendars, reminders, photo library, and location data.251    
  
B.  Regulating Business-to-Platform Relations 
 
What is the appropriate legal and regulatory response to the 
growing dependencies of business on mobile platforms? 
While discussion of this question goes beyond the scope of 
this Article and will be explored in depth in future work,  the 
European Commission has recently considered the 
possibility of E.U. regulatory action concerning business-to-
platform relations, and noted that “many small” and “some 
larger” European businesses have “come to depend on 
platforms,” including app stores, that provide “easy access to 
customers and markets.”252  
                                                 
249 Complaint at 6, In re Snapchat, Inc., (F.T.C. No. 132-3078), 2014 WL 
7495798 at *4. 
250 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order 
Settling Charges Against Snapchat (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-approves-final-order-settling-
charges-against-snapchat. 
251 What’s New in iOS 6.0, APPLE, INC., https://developer.apple.com/ 
library/archive/releasenotes/General/WhatsNewIniOS/Articles/iOS6.ht
ml#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40011812-SW7 (last updated June 6, 2017). 
252 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 5. 
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The European Commission described this dependency 
as entailing an “imbalance of bargaining power,” which may 
give “scope for unfair behaviour” by platforms.253 Following 
fact-finding by the European Commission in the form of 
stakeholder workshops,254 and an industry survey,255 the 
Commission indicated that “some” online platforms engage 
in “harmful trading practices to the detriment of their 
business users,” and identified six issues: (i) non-
negotiability of terms and conditions, which may be changed 
unilaterally and unannounced; (ii) removal of products or 
services, including unilateral account suspensions without 
prior notice,256 and lack of appeal or statement of reasons; 
(iii) lack of transparency of platforms’ practices, notably 
concerning search and ranking and advertising placements; 
(iv) platforms may favor their own products or services, or 
discriminate between different third-party suppliers and 
sellers, including tying business users to the platforms' 
exclusive auxiliary services (e.g. payment services or 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 See e.g., Report of an Engagement Workshop Hosted by the European 
Commission, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 19, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/data-related-aspects-business-platform-trading-
practices-workshop-report (discussing the findings of a workshop 
organized under Chatham House rule to discuss specific issues related to 
trading practices between online platforms and their business users). 
255 Commission Consultation on What is Your Experience in Trading on 
Online Platforms?, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 7, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/ 
digital-single-market/en/news/what-your-experience-trading-online-
platforms (“All provided information and data will be treated as strictly 
confidential.”). See Online Platform Environment, supra note 5 
(discussing the results of the survey). 
256 See Nicolas Jaimes, Datas de géolocalisation: Apple éjecte plusieurs 
médias français de l'App Store [Geolocation Data: Apple Ejects Multiple 
French Media from the App Store], LE JOURNAL DU NET, (Apr. 15, 2018, 
2:21 PM) (Fr.) (explaining that a number of French news media apps were 
removed from the App Store in April 2018 for transmitting user location 
data to third parties without explicit consent). 
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advertising exchanges); (v) business users may lack access to, 
or the ability to transmit or port, certain types of data, both 
of a personal and non-personal character (e.g. no access to 
customer contact details, or contractually limited in their 
ability to use data generated through a specific platform); 
and (vi) no meaningful or effective redress.257 The 
Commission argues that because of business users’ 
increasing dependency on online platforms to reach markets, 
these platform practices can have “significant direct negative 
effects” on many European businesses.258 This may lead to 
disengagement from online platforms, hamper the ability to 
reach markets, indirectly harm consumers by limiting 
product and service choice, and could have significant 
negative effects on the wider platform ecosystem, including 
potential new entrant platforms.   
Further, in April 2018, the European Commission 
published a proposal for an E.U. regulation on fairness and 
transparency for business users of online intermediation 
services.259 The proposal seeks to cover app stores, and 
includes rules on terms and conditions, suspension and 
termination, ranking, differentiated treatment, complaint 
handling, and codes of conduct.260 Notably, Article 7 of the 
Regulation concerns access to data, and provides that mobile 
platforms must provide business users with a description of 
the technical and contractual access to any personal data or 
other data which consumers provide for the user of the mobile 
platform, or which is generated through mobile platforms.261  
The European Commission considered that providing “a 
single, more far-reaching data sharing obligation,” was 
                                                 
257 Commission Impact Assessment, supra note 5.  
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259 See supra note 44. 
260 See id. at arts. 3–6, 9–11. 
261 See id. at art. 7. 
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“judged to be disproportionate.”262 In light of this possible 
legislative action, SEC disclosures can provide additional 
empirical evidence of such dependencies. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In 2011, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued 
guidance on disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity 
risks and cyber incidents, given the “increasing dependence” 
of public companies on “digital technologies.”263 Because this 
dependence increased, the risks to public companies 
associated with cybersecurity also increased, resulting in 
more frequent and severe cyber incidents, prompting the 
SEC to issue the guidance.264 This has been followed by 
further SEC guidance in 2018 on cybersecurity disclosures.265 
One may argue that, as demonstrated in our SEC filings 
study, there is now a similar “dependence” of many of the 
largest public companies not only on digital technologies, but 
also on user data and mobile platforms.266 Indeed, the SEC 
Chairman recently acknowledged that “data collection, 
storage, analysis, availability[,] and protection. . . have 
become fundamental to the function and performance of our 
capital markets, [and] the individuals and entities that 
participate in those markets.”267 Given this dependence, the 
growing business impact of data privacy rules, and in light of 
recent data privacy scandals involving the standards for apps 
to access data through online platforms, one may expect the 
SEC to heighten its scrutiny of or even consider issuing 
                                                 
262 Id. at 8.  
263 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., CF DISCLOSURES GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 
CYBERSECURITY (2011). 
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guidance on user data and privacy-related disclosures in the 
future. While there was a concern that detailed disclosures 
“could compromise cybersecurity efforts,”268 no such concerns 
would be applicable to data protection disclosures.   
Second, while the Article demonstrates that apps have 
a considerable dependence on mobile platforms for the 
collection and use of data,269 this may not necessarily be a 
bad thing from a user privacy perspective. Because of the 
control mobile platforms exercise over access to and 
monetization of user data, regulatory action taken by or 
targeted at mobile platforms may be quite effective (e.g. FTC 
settlement with Apple Inc. over in-app purchases by 
children). Further, where a mobile platform adopts a policy 
change in favor of user privacy (e.g. Apple Inc.’s iOS 6), the 
impact on the app ecosystem is quite pronounced. In contrast, 
the European Commission has suggested as a policy option 
of developing “rules on data access and use” to benefit 
companies dependent on online platforms,270 to address the 
concern that “business users to some extent lack access to 
and/or the ability to transmit or port certain types of data, 
both of a personal and non-personal character.”271 This 
included “targeted marketing initiatives,” and the “ability to 
use data generated through a specific platform to improve 
their activities on other platforms.”272 However, the 
European Commission recognizes that “the possible increase 
in transmissions of personal data between different 
controllers (platforms and business users) must be assessed” 
in light of data protection regulation.273 While this approach 
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of increasing the “transmissions” of data would address the 
potential anti-competitive effects of dependencies on mobile 
platforms, it could also increase the risks to data privacy. In 
other words, policy makers will have to address the same 
dilemma as faced by the platforms themselves: balancing the 
interests of data-driven businesses, while reducing the risk 
to mobile users’ privacy.     
Finally, while the primary purpose of this Article was 
to explore evidence of the dependence of mobile apps on 
mobile platforms for the collection, use and monetization of 
personal information, the Article also demonstrates that SEC 
filings are a rich and fertile ground for privacy research more 
generally. In light of the size and specific organization of SEC 
filings, they may be an interesting source of information for 
automated text analysis of privacy issues and developments. 
Future research could also broaden the scope of the inquiry 
to examine mobile advertising companies, mobile data 
analytics companies, and the securities filings of public 
companies in other jurisdictions.  
